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Abstract. This paper studies the deception applied on agent in a par-
tially observable Markov decision process. We introduce deceptive ker-
nel function (the kernel) applied to agent’s observations in a discrete
POMDP. Based on value iteration, value function approximation and
POMCP three characteristic algorithms used by agent, we analyze its
belief being misled by falsified observations as the kernel’s outputs and
anticipate its probable threat on agent’s reward and potentially other
performance. We validate our expectation and explore more detrimental
effects of the deception by experimenting on two POMDP problems. The
result shows that the kernel applied on agent’s observation can affect its
belief and substantially lower its resulting rewards; meantime certain im-
plementation of the kernel could induce other abnormal behaviors by the
agent.
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1 Introduction
Deception as a concept has its meaning and utility wide across different disci-
plines and subjects [13]. Within the field of cybersecurity, deception as a general
strategy has been discussed frequently in the game-theoretic framework from
the defender perspective. Carroll and Grosu [3] have investigated the ‘honeypot’
strategy as a deceptive approach taken by defenders and modeled the defender
and attacker’s behaviors after deployment of deception as a signaling game.
Pawlick et al. [12] have proposed a model of deception based on cheap-talk sig-
naling game with a probabilistic deception detector. Ding et al. [4] have given a
dynamic game model for the deployment of deception against reactive jamming
attacks. As stated by Pawlick et al. in the taxonomy and survey of defensive
deception [13], game theory provides an theoretical base for modeling of cy-
bersecurity scenarios as it precisely describe the competitive and adversarial
relationship between defender and attacker.
Partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) as a general frame-
work of sequential decision process is also widely used in cybersecurity researches
of defensive and attacking approaches. From defender’s perspective, Miehling et
al. in [10] have adopted POMDP to optimally interfere the attacker’s progres-
sion; Hu et al. in [7] have also modeled the defense problem with POMDP and
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proposed online algorithm for adaptive defense measure. Yu and Brooks [22]
have applied POMDP and its approximation solution as a stochastic tool for
network intrusion detection. On the other hand, Sarraute et al. [17] in an at-
tacker’s view have introduced POMDP in attack planning issue of penetration
testing. In either way, POMDP being a model concerning partial observability
and probabilistic transition is a handful tool for cybersecurity researches and
more researches related to decision-making.
However, as an “overlapping” field of deception strategy and POMDP’s ap-
plication areas, few research in cybersecurity has investigated the deceptive ap-
proaches in POMDP, or other stochastic sequential decision-making models.
Hora´k et al. in [6] have adopted the model of one-sided partially observable
stochastic game (POSG) and discussed the proactive deceptive actions by the
defender as an approach to manipulate the adversary’s (the attacker) belief.
In [2], Ahmadi et al. have also formalized the deception game as one-sided POSG
for further implementation of its solution. While both authors aims to put de-
ception issue in a stochastic decision-making setting with partial observability,
they have also stressed that the difficulty of this combination resides in the in-
tractability of solving a general POSG, where the imperfect information of both
parties presents substantial theoretical and computational challenges. On the
other hand, POMDP modeling the decision process of a single agent is limited
in describing adversarial scenario, which is suggested as a nature of deception in
general. These factors limit the relative research in cybersecurity area, and fur-
ther our understanding in general over an agent whose decisions follow POMDP
model is meantime deceived.
Out of the box of cybersecurity, relative researches across deception and
stochastic decision-making process are just emerging in optimal control and re-
inforcement learning areas. Ornik and Topcu in [11] have introduced a mathe-
matical framework for deception in optimal control based on Markov decision
process (MDP). However, the framework has a prerequisite of its deception ob-
jective being reward-based. Wu et al. [21] have studied the agent’s behavior
within an MDP environment subject to a reward-based adversarial deception,
which in the meantime leverages the cognitive bias of the human. More related
researches have emerged recently in reinforcement learning (RL) area regarding
the security and stability of RL process. Huang and Zhu [8] have investigated the
falsified cost signal in RL with Q-learning algorithm by analyzing its impact on
algorithm’s convergence and the mechanism of misleading effect by the cost falsi-
fication. Russo and Proutiere in [16] have introduced an optimal attack targeting
a given policy of the RL agent by modeling this problem as an MDP and solve
it with Deep RL techniques. Zhang et al. and Rakhsha et al. in their respective
researches [23] and [14] have proposed a training-time poisoning attack targeting
the environment (reward and dynamics of MDP) and specifically reward. Both
researches aim to achieve policy manipulation/teaching through manipulation
of original MDP to a ‘poisonous’ MDP. While these researches all demonstrate
novel and inspirational work from their respective angle, they are meantime
subject to several common limitations. Attacks modeled in researches [11], [23]
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and [14] are subject to certain “objectives” of deception/attack; research in [21]
considers human cognitive bias as a reason for agent’s potential suboptimal
choices; models in [21], [16], [23] and [14] are computed with underlying MDP
regardless of agent’s partial observability as a potential setting; and some of the
tactics introduced above are more attacking rather than deceptive.
In POMDP, the agent naturally maintains a belief over environment’s state
as a brief and adequate substitution of entire ‘history’, because of the absence of
state information. As is quoted by Pawlick et al. in [13], a definition of deception
is given as “to intentionally cause another person to acquire or continue to have
a false belief, or to be prevented from acquiring or cease to have a true belief”.
The coincidence of ‘belief’ in both statements motivates our questions: “how do
we deceive an agent’s belief in POMDP without a macro objective” and “what
is the impact of this deception on agent’s decision making in a POMDP”. Moti-
vated by the achievements and limitations from aforementioned work, we hope to
introduce a deceptive approach regarding a RL agent with partial observability.
Specifically, regardless of the adversarial nature of deception and an objective-
based attacking model, we apply a simple modification to agent’s observation
through the implementation of deceptive kernel function. We aim to evaluate its
influence on agent’s belief, and as a result its decisions and returns. Meantime,
we also investigate how ‘successful’ the deceptive approach is through the reflec-
tions of several indices. The main contributions of our paper can be summarized
as follows:
– We formalize the deceptive kernel function in POMDP and introduce three
simple implementations.
– We investigate agent’s belief and decisions under the impact of deception
and provide theoretical reasoning of deceptive effect based on three different
algorithms adopted by the agent.
– We carry out experiments on two POMDP problems. By comparing statistics
from baseline and experiments under deception, we evaluate the effectiveness
of our approach.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
2.1 POMDP
An MDP is a discrete-time stochastic control process. It provides a model of in-
teractions between an environment and an agent, whose decision making satisfies
the Markov Property, the Memoryless property of a stochastic process such that
given a present state (time t and state kt), the past (kt−i) and the future (kt+i)
are independent. An MDP can be formalized as a 5-tuple {S,A, T,R, γ}. S is the
set of states. A is the set of actions. T (T (s, a, s′)) is the transition model that
specifies the probability from state s to state s′ taking action a. R (R(s, a, s′))
is the reward model that provides the stepwise reward provided with the state
transition and action taken.
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A POMDP is a generalization of MDP such that its underlying dynamics is
an MDP, but the transition model and the actual state information is hidden
from the agent, where the partial observability stands for. This paper studies
the discrete and finite POMDP, whose state space is a discrete and finite set. It
can be formalized as a 7-tuple: {S,A, T,R,Ω,O, γ}:
– S is a finite set of states.
– A is a finite set of actions.
– T is the transition model of the underlying MDP.
– R is the reward model of the underlying MDP.
– Ω is the set of observations.
– O : O(o|s′, a) is the condtional observation model that specifies the proba-
bility of observation o given state s′ and action a.
– γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor portrays the stepwise reward loss.
Because of the absence of state information, the agent needs to maintain a
belief b of its state, a probability distribution over the state space. The belief
updating model along with the introduction of belief is the transition probability
function of belief that follows the Bayes’ rule. It can be formalized as below (η
is a normalizing constant):
b′(s′) = ηO(o|s′, a)
∑
s∈S
T (s′|s, a)b(s), η = 1
Pr(o|b, a) (1)
Pr(o|b, a) =
∑
s′∈S
O(o|s′, a)
∑
s∈S
T (s′|s, a)b(s)
The introduction of belief and belief update allows us to transform a POMDP
into a belief MDP, whose states are the belief states of the agent and the tran-
sition model is the combination of original transition, observation and belief
update models. The belief, as its literal meaning of agent’s knowledge and con-
ception of its state, is intrinsically the target of deception, which to many extents
stands for the approach and methodology that has one major objective of af-
fecting and manipulating the target’s belief. It will underly the major analysis
of our proposed deceptive approach in this paper.
2.2 Observation Model and Deceptive Kernel Function Specification
Deceptive kernel function (abbr. kernel) is an approach we introduce that aims
to deceive its target, in this case the agent in a POMDP, through manipulation
of observation. The kernel stands for kernel function, that, with the input of the
original observation o, outputs a new observation o′.
Kernel : Ω → Ω, o′ = Kernel(o)
A straightforward yet inaccurate analogy of the kernel is sunglasses, which trans-
form the input view to a filtered darker one. The kernel in our conception and
experiment can do more, such as reversing the input observation, or masking the
original and sampling an irrelevant one.
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Kernel Target
The deceptive kernel targets the observation received by the agent. Generic
observations in many real-life POMDP-like problems take various forms. The
Tiger Problem, a simple POMDP introduced by Kaelbling et al. in [9] and ex-
perimented in this paper provides a binary observation; a sound by the tiger (a
probabilistic indicator of the presence of tiger) is heard from either door by the
agent. In another experiment carried out in this paper with RockSample Prob-
lem, a POMDP abstracted from rover exploration of robots [20], the observation
set Ω is comprised of informative observations and uninformative ones. The for-
mer subset of observations is divided based on the observed target such that
each target has a corresponding and unique binary observation space of being
positive and negative. The latter, being “uninformative” on the other hand, can-
not trigger a belief-update when it is perceived, and it maintains the irrelevance
from agent’s decision or state transition.
In this paper, we focus on informative observations and ignore the uninfor-
mative ones from being a target of our kernel because they cannot contribute to
the influence imposing on agent’s belief. Decision process in real life allows for
not only binary or finite discrete results of observation, but infinite and contin-
uous ones. In order to maintain the simplicity of computation, we only consider
POMDP with discrete finite set of observations in our analysis and experiments.
Kernel Specification
In many POMDP model abstracted and generated from real-life problems,
we usually consider noise factor in the environment. The noise factor originates
from the fact that agent’s sensors, being human or machine sensations, are inher-
ently noisy. It contributes to the innate deception that the natural environment
exerts on us. Therefore, we apply a probabilistic observation model which can
be formalized as below:
Define pT ∈ [0, 1] be the correct rate of our sensor outputting correct obser-
vation regarding a specific observed object; pF = 1 − pT be the noisy index.
Assume there is one single true observation ot and a set of possible fake possible
observations OF . The probabilistic model can be formalized as:
P (o|o = ot) = pT ; P (o|o ∈ OF ) = pF
Based on this model, we design and hereby introduce three kinds deceptive
kernels, Prob, Rand and Oppo, with respective deception mechanisms which can
be formulized as below:
Prob kernel: Define pk as the deceptive rate. The Prob kernel serves as a filter
that allows fewer correct observation at the ratio of pk provided with original
noisy observation model.
PProb(o|o = ot) = pT · pk, PProb(O|o ∈ OF ) = 1− pT · pk (2)
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Rand kernel: Rand kernel outputs a uniformly random sample from the obser-
vation space: Ω = {ot} ∪OF .
PRand(o|o = ot) = 1|Ω| , P (o|o ∈ OF ) = 1−
1
|Ω| (3)
Oppo kernel: Oppo kernel deterministically outputs the false observation.
POppo(o|o = ot) = 0, P (o|o ∈ OF ) = 1 (4)
Remark 1. From computational perspective, we can treat the Rand kernel and
Oppo kernel as special cases of Prob kernel with respectively PProb =
1
|Ω| and
PProb = 0. In other words, all three kernels are probabilistic kernels with dif-
ferent ‘degrees’. The underlying reason of this categorization is the difference
in the implementations of kernels, primarily the programming implementations.
The Rand kernel was implemented with an observation sampler which ignores
the original input; the other two was realized through masking strategy with
their respective filtering rate PProb. The difference also imply the actual decep-
tion strategy in real-life implementations. The Rand kernel can target the agent
by blinding its sensor, while the others are more likely targeting the environ-
ment factors such as introducing more artificial noise, transforming signals from
agent’s observed object or ‘honeypot’ strategy [3].
Remark 2. Regarding the trivial difference between two POMDP problems stud-
ied in this paper, the Tiger problem adopts a simple probabilistic observation
model as mentioned in [9] with p = 0.85. The RockSample problem however
adopts a slight variance of the model such that the correct rate p is not a con-
stant, but a variable satisfying:
p =
1
2
· (1 + 2− dD ) (5)
d is the distance from agent to the target rock; D is the constant marking the
distance of 0.75 correct rate and has value 20.0 in our experiment.
This original setting aims to consider the actual performance attributes of
detecting sensors whose detecting accuracy decreases when they target farther
objects. From our experimental purpose to distinguish between Prob kernel and
the others with regard to deception effect, we adopt the deceptive rate pk in our
experiments to satisfy that the aggregate deceptive rate of natural environmental
noise and the Prob kernel is no worse than the Rand kernel in both POMDPs,
especially for the worst case in RockSample problem. Briefly, we guarantee in our
experiment that Pprob > PRand > POppo = 0 with regard to aggregate correct
rates Pprob, PRand, POppo of outputting true observation respectively for three
kernels.
Cost for Deception
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In the experiment with RockSample problem, we further introduce the cost
of deception as a considered factor. However, different from the cases in [3]
where the authors models the problem as a signaling game with two parties the
attacker and the defender, there is no adversary to the agent in POMDP problem.
The essential target of our deceptive kernel is the environment regardless of the
implementation. The kernel aims to “modify” the environment to be noiser and
more deceptive. And this modification is less likely to be free of charge in real
life. To implement this idea, we treat the cost of deception as a tiny reward to
the agent. Specifically, we introduce a stepwise reward rd associated with each
application of deceptive kernel and combine the reward with original rewarding
model of the problem.
Remark 3. The probabilistic observation model allows the cases of false obser-
vation received by the agent as a result of environmental noise. Meantime, the
probabilistic deceptive kernels also allows correct observation as long as the ag-
gregate deceptive rate is greater than 0. The combination of two models raises
a special case where natural observation acquired by the agent is false while
the observation processed by deceptive kernel is true. This also alludes a real
case that the agent can be wrong with what it observes; a random guess can
be correct on the contrary. Therefore, we define two Boolean flags isFalse and
isDeceived regarding the observations od = Kernel(o) which is processed with
deceptive kernel, provided with the original observation o (which would have
been perceived by the agent without kernel).
Define the single true observation is ot, (the set of false observations is OF ), the
original observation is o:
isFalse(od) = (od 6= ot)
isDeceived(od) = (od 6= o)
3 Analysis of POMDPs Applied with Deceptive Kernel
In this section, we investigate the application of deceptive kernel on two simple
POMDP problems through the theoretical approach. Particularly, we borrow a
common case of observation model appeared in both problems experimented in
this paper and evaluate the discrepancy of the resulting beliefs after receiving
the correct and incorrect observations. Provided that agent’s belief is directly
affected by the deceptive observations, we assume the agent can further re-
ceive collateral damage, potentially in its actions, rewards and other aspects of
decision-making process. One example of damage could be a significantly pro-
longed duration of game-play by the agent, who wanders around inside the maze
as being deceived. Then, based on the algorithms used by the agent in either
problem, we evaluate these potential detrimental effects to the player’s decision-
making that can be indirectly attributed to the deception.
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3.1 Belief Affected by Deception
We re-visit the belief-update rule in POMDP in formula (1).
b′(s′) = ηO(o|s′, a)
∑
s∈S
T (s′|s, a)b(s), η = 1
Pr(o|b, a)
The new belief of the agent is jointly determined by the following factors: agent’s
prior belief, transition model and observation probabilistic model of the POMDP.
The formula considers the complex possibilities of belief updating in theory. Now
we simplify the belief updating model in multiple approaches.
We first limit the represented target of state s to a single object with binary
state instead of the entire environment. In the case of Tiger problem, the state of
entire environment is binary. In the more complex case of RockSample, the state
of environment can be split into two parts, the agent’s position and the rocks’
states. The former is independent from agent’s observation model and the belief
updating model, primarily because the agent’s position is purely controlled by
the agent’s deterministic moving actions, i.e., agent is not allowed to make illegal
moving action that leads to a forbidden position; all the legal moving actions will
deterministically get the agent to the target position. The latter can be further
disassembled into eight binary states corresponding to eight fixed and known
rock positions in the map. States in real life are more likely to be continuous
and comprehensive instead of singular or discrete. However, treating the state s
as a singular binary descriptor reasonably simplifies the computation and allows
us to carry out analysis on belief towards a single observed target.
Further, we categorize the action set A into two subsets for operating actions
Aop and observing actions Aob. The former set contains actions that only transit
the environment’s state but do not generate an observation or induce a belief-
update. The latter set contains actions that only generate an observation but do
not transit the state.
Define aop is an operating action if, by taking aop, the environment transits from
state s to s′, while the agent’s belief remains as previous.
b(s′) = b(s)
Define aob is an observing action if, by taking aob at time k, the environment
maintains its previous state sk, and the agent receives a binary observation oob
For sk+1 = sk, T (sk+1|s, aob) = 1, O(oob|sk, aob, sk+1) >= 0;
for sk+1 6= sk, T (sk+1|s, aob) = 0, O(oob|sk, aob, sk+1) = 0
Remark 4. The purpose of introducing categorization of actions is not to redefine
all actions and steps in POMDP, but to distinguish the ‘belief-update’ stage from
the ‘operation’ stage. A generic step in POMDP consists of action-taking, state-
transiting, observing and belief-updating processes. An instance of explorative
rover robot and possibly many real-life robots shows that the detecting actions
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taken by their sensor works independently from their dynamic operations, even
though both functionalities share the same control flow. By splitting at the
middle of transiting and observing, we aim to create a stage of observation and
belief state transition independent from the environment’s state transition. We
want to focus on agent’s belief update resulted purely from receiving deceptive
observation, and evaluate the difference between the deceived belief and the true
belief.
Now we define s a binary state with value either 0 or 1. After the agent
performs an observing action, it can either receive the true observation oT at
probability pT , or the false observation oF at probability pF . pF = 1− pT .
Define the agent’s current belief towards binary state s is b(s) = (p0, p1). With-
out loss of generality, we assume the true state of s is s = 0. Hence, oT = o0,
oF = o1.
Having received the true observation, the observation probabilities are:
O(oT |s = 0) = pT , O(oT |s = 1) = pF
The true belief b′(s) after belief updating is:
b′(s = 0) =
O(oT |s = 0) · b(s = 0)
O(oT |s = 0) · b(s = 0) +O(oT |s = 1) · b(s = 1)
b′(s = 1) =
O(oT |s = 1) · b(s = 1)
O(oT |s = 0) · b(s = 0) +O(oT |s = 1) · b(s = 1)
On the other hand, the observation probabilities having received the false obser-
vation are:
O(oF |s = 0) = pF , O(oF |s = 1) = pT
The deceived belief b′′(s) after belief updating is:
b′′(s = 0) =
O(oF |s = 0) · b(s = 0)
O(oF |s = 0) · b(s = 0) +O(oF |s = 1) · b(s = 1)
b′′(s = 1) =
O(oF |s = 1) · b(s = 1)
O(oF |s = 0) · b(s = 0) +O(oF |s = 1) · b(s = 1)
We evaluate the difference of agent’s belief towards s = 0 between both cases:
b′(s = 0)
b′′(s = 0)
=
pT · p0
pT · p0 + pF · p1 ·
(
pF · p0
pF · p0 + pT · p1
)−1
=
pT (pF · p0 + pT · (1− p0))
pF (pT · p0 + pF · (1− p0))
=
p2T − (pT − pF )pT p0
p2F + (pT − pF )pF p0
As the pT , pF being constants with assumption that pT > pF and pT + pF = 1,
we can easily see the above ratio monotonously decrease as p0 ranges from 0 to
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1. Then we get:
b′(s = 0)
b′′(s = 0)
∈ [1, (pT
pF
)2] (6)
The result shows that the difference between a true belief and a deceived belief
can be as large as ( pTpF )
2 times. In the experiment of Tiger problem and Rock-
Sample problem, we adopt pT = 0.85. The upper bound of discrepancy being
32.11 is outstanding.
3.2 Decision Affected by Deception
Actions taken by the agent are primarily decided by the agent’s policy, which
is generated by its adopted solutions. Solutions to POMDPs vary significantly
across their settings, strategies and even specific stepwise approaches. However,
since the state information is not available, the agent must rely on what is ob-
servable and consider the history of its past actions and observations in deciding
its next move. Belief state as the carrier of history plays a crucial role in deciding
which action is optimal at current step. A deceived agent misled by false observa-
tion are more likely suffering from its unwise actions because the agent makes its
‘supposed’ optimal choice on top of the incorrect basis, its belief. As the specific
action-selection mechanism varies across different POMDP solutions or plan-
ning methods, it is difficult for us to enumerate all solutions to rationalize the
detrimental effect resulted from deceptive observations. In the following section,
we investigate three solutions to POMDP, the Value Iteration [19], the Linear
Value Function Approximation [15,5] and the POMCP [18]. These algorithms
were proposed by previous researches in chronological order and are correspond-
ingly an optimal value function algorithm, an offline approximate algorithm and
an online planning algorithm. We provide a simple and illustrative reasoning of
misleading and detrimental effect from deceived incorrect belief respectively for
these mentioned algorithms.
Value Iteration and Linear Value Function Approximation
POMDP can be solved optimally for a specified finite horizon H by using the
value iteration algorithm [19]. Further researches by Smallwood and Sondik [19]
shows that optimal value function for a finite-horizon POMDP can be repre-
sented by hyperplanes, which are often called α-vectors [15]. Each α-vector is
associated with some action and the vector defines the linear value function over
belief space. By computing and finding the α-vector mapping a specified belief
to the maximum value, one can select the optimal action that corresponds to
this vector.
Value iteration algorithm computes α-vectors by recursively applying the
Bellman update as the horizon increases. Although it provides an exact value
computing approach for POMDP, the required space for α-vectors grows ex-
ponentially as the algorithm iterates [15]. This brings about the introduction of
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approximate algorithms for value function. In the Linear Value Function approx-
imation method, we treat α-vectors as parameterized linear function over belief
space and use a single-layer neural network to approximate the parameters of
the function, essentially the α-vectors. In both solutions, we aim to compute or
approximate the α-vectors because they can lead the agent to its optimal action
whose corresponding α-vector maps the provided belief to maximum value.
An illustration of resulting α-vectors applying value iteration at the horizon
H = 8 on the Tiger problem is given by Patrick in his project as Figure 1 [1]. We
can visualize the α-vectors and, moreover, the vector mapping a belief state to
its maximum value and its counterpart optimal action. Meantime, we consider
the preliminary analysis on the deceived agent’s belief compared with its true
belief. As the belief state of s = 0 traverses from the 0 to 1, its corresponding
optimal action shifts among the action space. A deceived belief being diverged
from its true value can be mapped to a wrong optimal action. The deceptive
observation proves its utility in diverging agent’s belief that possibly leads to a
nonoptimal decision made by agent.
Fig. 1. α-vectors applying value iteration at the horizon H = 8 on Tiger problem
Furthermore, we can consider other effect from a special case of deceptive
observation. The Rand deceptive kernel mentioned in Kernel Specification
section “blinds” the agent by feeding the agent randomly generated observation
as counterfeit. Its application in Tiger POMDP can lead the agent to a ‘trap’
of repeatedly using one single action. The reason is that the agent is initialized
with an impartial prior belief of the binary state with value (p0, p1) = (0.5, 0.5).
The Figure 1 shows that at initial state the agent is destined to listen (action 0)
because it needs observations to update its belief. A correctly diverged belief can
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guide the agent to open the correct door, either by taking action 1 or 2. However,
with Rand kernel applied, the agent could be repeatedly fed with contradictive
observations, resulting in its belief to swing around the impartial state rather
than diverge to either side. Therefore, the agent can be “mentally” trapped by
disbelief in either side and repeatedly use listen, meantime suffering the tiny cost
affiliated to listen until its belief eventually diverges.
To theoretically rationalize this effect of prolonging the duration by trapping
the agent’s belief with repeatedly contradictive observation, we assume a simple
example where the original observation model gives correct observation at prob-
ability pT > 0.5, and the agent’s initial belief is (p0, p1) = (0.5, 0.5). The agent
will stop taking the listen action and escape from trap until either p0 or p1 is
larger than pT . We assume the binary observation is either T or F .
Then, with one single observation, the agent cannot escape. The agent can
escape after two observing actions if it receives either [T, T ] or [F, F ]; it cannot
escape otherwise. The agent cannot escape after 4 consecutive observations if
primarily it does not escape after first two steps, and the last two observations
it receives are either [T, F ] or [F, T ]. We can simply calculate the probability of
failure to escape after 2 steps and 4 steps as P2(fail) and P4(fail) respectively:
P2(fail) = 2pT (1− pT )
P4(fail) = [2pT (1− pT )]2
With original setting of pT = 0.85, we can get:
P2(fail) = 0.255, P4(fail) = 0.065
With Rand kernel applied and pT = 0.5, we have:
P ′2(fail) = 0.5, P
′
4(fail) = 0.25
The difference reflects that with Rand kernel, the agent is more likely trapped
by the misinformation from deceptive observations.
Partially Observable Monte-Carlo Planning (POMCP)
POMCP is the extension of Monte-Carlo tree search to partially observable
environments [18]. It consists of a UCT (Upper Confidence bound for Tree)
search and an unweighted particle filter. A core contribution of the method is
the introduction of search tree of histories, whose node T (h) is defined by its
corresponding history h as T (h) =< N(h), V (h), B(h) >. N(h) and V (h) are the
visit counter and the value of h respectively; they are used by UCT algorithm to
select the optimal action and are updated by simulator. B(h) is the set of state
particles used to approximate the belief state of h. At each step a real action is
executed and a real observation is observed, particles inside B(h) will be passed
into simulator and filtered; particles whose simulated observation matches the
real observation get to maintain in the set and are passed to the child history
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node. For detailed description of the algorithm, see [18]; for details regarding
implementation of the algorithm, see [1].
The reasoning behind the deceptive effect on agent’s action selection is even
more complicated compared to the previous case of value iteration, where the
optimality is achieved by the action of which the corresponding α-vector gives
the maximum value for the given belief state. The UCT algorithm considers each
actions’ value and its corresponding visit count, with underlying reason that the
algorithm aims to balance the exploration and the exploitation. The value of
an action is approximated by the mean q-value of the action and is computed
through Monte-Carlo simulations. We consider the pool of belief state particles
B(h) of history h which is affected by deceptive observations throughout. Par-
ticles inside B(h) are more likely prone to the deceived belief state rather than
its true belief. This can be seen from the fact that particles are filtered by real
observations which are potentially falsified. As these particles being sampled
during Monte-Carlo Simulation and input to the simulator, the expected return
is relatively lower if the rewarding model encourages true belief and penalizes
false ones to some extent.
In the example of RockSample problem, the Sample action is the only action
that induces reward (except from entering the terminal state). It returns a pos-
itive reward only if agent’s belief towards the targeting rock matches the actual
state and that the rock must be good. On the other hand, it returns a penalty if
the belief state does not match the actual state of the rock, regardless of what the
actual state is. Combining with the previous analysis of stepwise belief, we see
that deceptive kernels generating falsified observations are theoretically effective
in this problem.
4 Experiment with Two POMDP Problems
In this section, we investigate two POMDP problems, the Tiger Problem and
the RockSample Problem. The agent in the Tiger Problem applies the Linear
Function Approximation method [15,5] on the α-vectors. In the latter problem,
the agent adopts POMCP, a Monte-Carlo online planning algorithm introduced
in previous section.
4.1 Tiger Problem
The Tiger problem is a single-player game with a simple setting. The agent is
in front of two closed doors, one of which has a tiger behind. The underlying
MDP has the state space S with two states {TigerLeft, T igerRight}. The agent
has three actions {Listen,OpenLeft,OpenRight}. By listening, the agent will
hear a sound either from left or right door as an indication of tiger behind. Yet,
this observation is correct at probability pT = 0.85. By opening either door,
the agent will subsequently enter the terminal state. The Listen action has a
tiny penalty R(Listen) = −1. Opening the door without tiger behind will result
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in a reward R(safe) = 10. Otherwise, the agent will receive a larger penalty
R(dangerous) = −20.
We applied three kinds of deceptive mask as defined in Kernel Specifica-
tion. We assume for one Listen step the true observation is oT and the false one
is oF ; the agent receives o. Considering the environment’s noise and kernel’s de-
ception, the aggregate probabilities of the agent observing correctly affected by
each kernel are PProb(o = oT ) = 0.6, PRand(O = oT ) = 0.5, POppo(o = oT ) = 0
respectively.
Table 1. Statistics of Tiger Problem.
Baseline Prob Rand Oppo
Undiscounted return 4.90± 0.30 −3.01± 0.33 −9.96± 0.54 −20.47± 0.10
Discounted return 4.42± 0.28 −2.91± 0.31 −7.61± 0.42 −19.50± 0.10
# of Correct choices 895 623 488 0
# of incorrect choices 105 376 479 999
Other cases 0 1 33 1
Average listen times 1.33 1.42 5.20 1.28
We carry out baseline experiment with original POMDP, POMDPs applied
with Prob kernel, Rand kernel and Oppo kernel. During each run for above
POMDP models we investigate, we train the linear alpha vectors for 4500 epochs
and run a validation epoch every 10th epochs while collecting data from it. We
present the statistics of four sets of experiments in Table 1. It first compares the
undiscounted and discounted returns (with discount factor γ = 0.95) from 1000
validation epochs of two runs for each model. We see the negative influence on
agent’s return by the application of deceptive kernel, and the influence get worse
as the kernel becomes more deadly from Prob to Oppo. Also, in Table 1 we show
the agent’s final decisions’ distribution by the agent as for being correct or not.
In the baseline model, the agent manages to open the safe door at approximately
90% rate. This rate drops to 62% and 50% with the application of kernel. We
can also notice particularly that the agent averagely listens for 5.2 times with
the application of Rand kernel, while this index has value reliably less than 2
for three other cases. This confirms our analysis in section 3.2 that the agent
under this kernel are more probably trapped in a certain range of belief state,
so that the agent has to repeatedly listen, suffering a longer pain. In extreme
cases, we see the agent cannot decide the door within 50 steps and is forced out
eventually.
In Figure 2, we further plot the 2D histogram of agent’s final reward with its
belief state (the probability of tiger behind door 0). Particularly we enumerate
not only agent’s final belief, but its stepwise belief during decision process. The
figure shows that in most epochs of baseline model, the agent listens once or
twice and select the door. Although under the Prob kernel the agent behaves
similarly, it fails in more runs that lead to−20 penalty. From another perspective,
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we see that under Rand kernel the distribution is more scattered along the Y-
axis which represents agent’s return. This, combined with the index of average
listening steps, shows that agent must listen significantly more times to reach a
decision while the aggregate tiny penalties from Listening create this dispersive
distribution of final return. The Oppo kernel on the other extreme drives the
agent strictly to listen one single time before selecting the definite wrong door.
Fig. 2. 2D histogram of agent’s final reward over its belief state
We also plot the four experiments’ resulting α-vectors in Figure 3 to support
the result.
4.2 RockSample Problem
RockSample is a problem that models rover science exploration [20]. The agent
(rover) can traverse inside a map while sampling rocks at its immediate location.
The agent’s position and movement are deterministic and known to itself. The
rocks’ locations are also known by the agent, yet each rock has a binary state
either being Good or Bad. The agent also maintains a binary belief over every
rock and can only benefit from sampling a Good rock that is also believed to be
Good by the agent. Otherwise the agent will be penalized by sampling either a
bad rock or a believed-to-be-bad rock.
The map we adopt in experiment is given in Figure 4. “S” on the map marks
the start position (3, 0); “G” marks the exit area where the agent enters the exit
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Fig. 3. Resulting α-vectors in four experiments
state in the coming step. Integer ‘i’s (i ∈ [0, 7]) marks the 8 rock positions. The
action spaceA consists of 13 actionsA = {North, South,East,West, Sample, Check-
i}, i ∈ [0, 1, , 7]. The state space is the Cartesian product of locations and rock
states r = [r0, r1, . . . , r7] where ri being 1 or 0 represents ith rock is Good or
Bad respectively. The observation corresponding to each Check-i action is also
binary, at the probability pT of being the correct observation. pT is correlated to
the distance between the agent and the targeting rock, defined in formula (5).
For the three kernels, the corresponding rates of outputting true observation are
given in formula (2), (3) and (4) with pk = 0.8 in Prob kernel.
Experiment Results of RockSample
For experiment with each kernel and baseline model, we execute the program
for 500 epochs with randomly generated initial rock states, fixed lower and upper
bound for belief state particles in each belief node and fixed amount of simula-
tions for each Monte-Carlo tree search. We also carry out parallel comparison
experiments with more simulations and larger particle sets B(h) in each belief
node T (h). The result shows that the increase in these factors has very limited
influence on the agent’s return or decision-making. We provide in Table 2 the
statistics on the undiscounted and discounted return, average number of rocks
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Fig. 4. Map of RockSample Problem
sampled and checked, and average number of steps in agents’ decision process
for experiment with each setting.
Table 2. Statistics of RockSample Problem.
Baseline Prob Rand Oppo
Undiscounted return 23.42± 0.34 21.34± 0.30 15.68± 0.27 10.04± 0.03
Discounted return 15.26± 0.19 13.78± 0.18 8.93± 0.17 5.68± 0.06
Average sampled rocks 1.34 1.15 0.57 0.00
Average checkings 4.37 4.50 5.74 5.57
Average steps 14.21 13.88 14.65 12.86
The decrease in agent’s both return indices for models carried with deceptive
kernel is noticeable, which is also supported by the fewer numbers of Sample
actions made by the agent. From the index of agent’s average steps, we see a
similar effect of Rand kernel that the agent tends to make more observing actions
of Check as the Listen action in the Tiger problem. Although we discussed the
case in the latter problem as the agent being trapped by its belief, the underlying
reason in this case is yet obvious. The direct reason is that the Check action has
its value increased in belief nodes of the decision tree that makes itself a little
more favorable in Monte-Carlo tree search process. Behind the increased value of
the action, a possible explanation is that more Check -ings are needed to be done
in order to raise the agent’s certainty about a rock’s state, which is potentially
attractive to the agent as the Good rock state brings back a reward.
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Apart from above analysis on direct statistics, we also try to investigate the
causation between the deceptive kernel and agent’s decisions. We hope to find
connections between each false observation generated by the deceptive kernel to
a potential mistake made by the agent. Now we briefly describe a probable route
that leads from deception to mistake. The agent primarily receives a false obser-
vation which directly or indirectly changes its originally correct belief (regarding
a rock) to be incorrect. Later the agent manages to reach that rock position
but makes the wrong decision by either sampling a bad rock or ignoring a good
rock. We can notice three key stages in this route. First, a belief-change is (po-
tentially) triggered by the deceived observation; second, the agent later visits
the rock position; lastly, the agent makes a mistake at the position. In Table
3 we collect the statistics regarding the number of observations, the number of
belief-changes, and further the number of changes that can be attributed to the
false observation and deceived observation.
Table 3. Statistics of Observations and Belief Changes
(Number of) Baseline Prob Rand Oppo
Observations 2186 2252 2872 2784
Belief changes 561 661 1197 639
Belief change - false obs 28 129 546 639
Belief change - deceived obs 0 108 517 639
Table 3 clearly presents that belief changes induced by our artificial decep-
tion take up a significant part in experiments with Prob and Rand kernel, while
in the meantime the ones induced by normal observations remain at its base-
line amount. With Oppo kernel, not surprisingly all the observations and belief
changes are deceived.
From this result, we further investigate all of agent’s observations correlated
with agent’s later action regarding the targeted rock and give the investigated
statistics in Table 4. In Table 4, we categorize each observation in two major
classes {Normal,Deceived} and one of five subclasses {TP, TN,FP, FN, Ignore}.
Assume an observation received by the agent is o and is targeting rock i whose
position is pi. Then we define o is T if the observation itself is positive (regard-
less of being deceived or not) and F otherwise. We also define o is P if the agent
samples the rock i after observing o; define o is N if the agent after observing o
visits pi but does not sample it. Particularly, we also define o is of case Ignore if
o is positive but the agent after observing it does not visit pi.
Then for observations being Deceived and of case TP or FN, we assume there
is a causation between deceptive observation and agent’s mistake as it either
samples a bad rock (TP) or visit but ignore a good rock (FN ). For a deceptive
observation of case TN or FP, we say the deception fails as the agent ignores
the deception and manages to either sample the good rock or avoid the bad. On
the other hand, for a Normal (not deceived) observation of case TP or FN, it
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implies the causality that observation leads to agent’s right choice. Otherwise, a
normal observation being TN or FP implies the agent fails to decide correctly
based on the observation or is affected by environment error.
Table 4. Distribution of Categorized Observations
Observation Subclass Baseline Prob Rand Oppo
Normal
TP 556 510 281 0
FN 1169 1087 836 0
TN 25 31 25 0
FP 10 6 5 0
Ignore 426 360 345 0
Total 2186 1994 1492 0
(TP+FN)/(TP+FN+TN+FP) 0.98 0.98 0.97 N/A
Deceived
TP N/A 0 8 0
FN N/A 85 513 1134
TN N/A 2 5 29
FP N/A 81 158 0
Ignore N/A 90 696 1621
Total N/A 258 1380 2784
(TP+FN)/(TP+FN+TN+FP) N/A 0.51 0.76 0.98
We see in Table 1 that the ratio (TP +FN)/(TP +FN +TN +FP ), repre-
senting the ‘efficiency’ of deceived observations, is apparently not proportional
to the one of normal observations. If the agent receives a deceived observation
by Prob kernel and it later visits the rock position, there is around 50% chance
that the agent will make wrong decision with the rock. If the kernel switches to
Rand then the chance increases to 76%. This result backs up our assumption
that observations generated by deceptive kernel contribute to, if not lead to,
significantly more mistakes by the agent.
From another perspective, we plot the heatmap showing agent’s average oc-
currence at every position in the map as Figure 5. It is shown that in baseline
model the agent is the most explorative by having a relatively more dispersive
occurrence over the entire map. As the deceptive kernel gets more effective, the
agent tends to be more conservative regarding its path choice. With Oppo kernel
feeding entirely wrong observations, the agent almost fixes a fastest path to exit
from the map as soon as possible.
Further Experiment with Costly Deception in RockSample
Mentioned in section Cost for Deception, we also test our thought on
introducing a little reward rd = 1 to the agent for every time it receives a de-
ceptive observation. In Table 5, we provide statistics of the relative experiments
as parallel contents to Table 2. The undiscounted returns under deceptive kernel
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Fig. 5. Heatmaps of the agent’s occurrence
are not surprisingly higher than their parallel results in original setting, since
the agent is rewarded by being deceived. However, an interesting result is that,
regarding the discounted return under Rand kernel, a much higher average num-
ber (36.14) of Check -ings taken does not produce a proportionate return (13.85)
as compared with its parallel result (5.47; 8.63). The introduction of this tiny re-
ward to deception is seemingly a beneficial thing to the agent, and consequently
it induces agent’s greater favor and even attachment to it. However, excessive
investment on the certain action does not return at the same level as the discount
factor diminishes most of the agent’s effort.
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Table 5. Parallel results of experiments on costly deception
Baseline Prob Prob rewarded Rand Rand rewarded
Undiscounted return 23.70 20.80 24.69 15.30 41.33
Discounted return 15.21 13.21 14.15 8.63 13.85
Average sampled rocks 1.37 1.08 1.32 0.53 1.40
Average checkings 4.61 4.46 8.36 5.47 36.14
Average steps 14.57 13.85 18.31 14.05 46.32
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, a deceptive approach based on observation model in POMDP
problems has been introduced to study its potential influence on agent’s behav-
ior and return. We have provided three general implementations as deceptive
kernel functions that exert deception on agent’s observation. In section 3, the-
oretical reasoning has been given about the kernel’s effect on primarily agent’s
belief state and potentially the decision-making process, with certain limitations
in POMDP model’s settings and adopted algorithms. Experimental results in
section 4 supports our assumption and analysis about the kernel’s detrimental
effect on the return and causalities between deceptive observations and the in-
crease of agent’s mistakes. We also test a new setting of kernel in section 4.2 by
introducing rewarding deceptions and reach an interesting result for the Rand
kernel. Further work can be invested on introducing a general framework of de-
ceptive kernel function applicable to a generic POMDP problem, improving the
current kernel by raising its efficiency and targeting ability while lowering its
cost, and exploring more of the deception’s potential in adversarial games.
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